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Abstract
i
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the association between the stock returns and accounting earnings of
firms that have different levels of operational flexibility. Operational flexibility is a firm’s ability to
respond profitably to environmental fluctuations by shifting factors of production within a
multinational network of subsidiaries. The geographic breadth and depth of a firm’s multinational
network are used as indicators of operational flexibility. We find there is a significantly greater
coefficient between stock returns and accounting earnings for multinational firms that operate in many
countries, but limit their concentration in any one foreign country, than for other multinational firms
or domestic firms. This coefficient is significantly smaller for multinational firms whose foreign
subsidiaries are highly concentrated in a few countries. When all multinational firms are pooled
together, we find their earnings-returns association does not differ from that of domestic firms.
Introduction
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INTRODUCTION
A multinational corporation with operations in multiple geographic locations can profitably
respond to country-specific environmental shocks and fluctuations by shifting factors of production
across national borders. This ability, termed operational flexibility, has been studied by scholars in
management, manufacturing, finance, and economics. Kogut (1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1989), who has
led the conceptual discussion of operational flexibility, convincingly argues that a multinational firm
has flexibility options that enable it to exploit profit opportunities generated by varying country
environments. Researchers in different disciplines have developed mathematical models that verify
the value creation potential of operational flexibility (e.g., Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996; Kogut and
Kulatilaka, 1994; Mello et al. 1995).
Despite compelling theoretical work on the value of operational flexibility, only one empirical
study has addressed this subject. Allen and Pantzalis (1996) find operational flexibility to be positively
associated with their excess market value measure, suggesting that operational flexibility enhances
the market value of a firm. Their empirical tests, however, are constructed under a special condition,
and as a result, their findings cannot be generalized. Further, their study does not account for firm
size, a variable that is positively related to excess market value (Berger and Of k 1995; Errunza and
Senbet 1984; Lang and Stulz 1994). When we analyze the Allen and Pantzalis data using their
methodology, but add a control variable for firm size, we do not find any significant effect for
operational flexibility.
We use a different approach to examine whether operational flexibility has a payoff for firms.
Specifically, we examine the coefficient that relates stock returns to changes in earnings for firms that
have different levels of operational flexibility. This coefficient, often referred to as the earnings
response coefficient (ERC), represents the stock price response to the earnings changes reported by
a firm (Beaver 1968; Collins and Kothari 1989). The ERC indicates the extent to which investors
revise their expectations about a firm’s future earnings based on information conveyed by changes
in current earnings.
The ERC varies across firms: Its magnitude depends on the impact that changes in current
earnings have on future earnings. Investors assess these implications in terms of earnings persistence
and earnings growth potential. Current earnings changes are considered persistent if investors expect
the firm to maintain its new earnings level going forward. In such a case, the current earnings changes
have a permanent effect on future earnings and, therefore, greatly affect investors’ expectations of
future earnings. Consequently, the ERC will be large when earnings changes are perceived to be
permanent. If a change in current earnings is perceived as a one-time event, there will be little or no
stock price reaction from investors, and the ERC will be small.
Earnings growth potential is also a major determinant of ERC because investors value firms
with high earnings growth momentum. A current earnings change that implies greater growth
potential has more of an impact on investors’ expectations of future earnings than earnings changes
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that imply little or no growth potential. Therefore, expected growth potential positively affects
ERCs. The relationship between the ERC and expected earnings persistence and earnings growth is
a carefully studied and well-documented area in accounting literature (e.g., Collins and Kothari 1989;
Kormendi and Lipe 1987).
Several studies use the ERC as a test statistic to make inferences about investors’
expectations of firms that differ with respect to a study variable (e.g., Teoh and Wong 1993; Teets
1992). In a similar approach, we examine differences in the ERC  of firms with different levels of
operational flexibility. By doing so, we can determine the impact of operational flexibility on
investors’ valuation of firms’ earnings. If we find the ERCs of firms with high levels of operational
flexibility to be significantly greater than those of firms with low levels of operational flexibility, we
can infer that investors view operational flexibility as creating value for firms.
OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND ERC
Operational flexibility positively affects the ERC for at least two reasons. First, it enables
firms to achieve higher earnings growth. Given the differences in business environments across
countries, firms with operational flexibility can make profit-maximizing decisions regarding the
location to declare profits, the appropriate markets in which to concentrate market power, and the
location to raise low-cost capital. Differences in taxation codes across countries make it possible for
firms to transfer some profits and/or losses to locations where they are tax-advantaged.  In the event
of an environment change that results in increased labor costs in a particular country, operational
flexibility enables multinational corporations (MNCs) to shift the labor-intensive part of their
production from the high-cost country to a low-cost one. Such shifts cannot be achieved easily if the
firm is confined to a single country. Thus, operational flexibility gives MNCs the ability to shift the
production possibility frontier outward, which results in an increase in expected future cash flows,
and thus growth (Mello et al., 1995).
Second, operational flexibility enables firms to reduce the uncertainty of future earnings that
arises from economic exposure and hence increase earnings persistence. Economic exposure is the
long-term effect of changes in exchange rates on the future prices, sales, and costs (Hill, 1997). All
firms, with and without operational flexibility, face unanticipated shifts in nominal and real exchange
rates. Firms without operational flexibility must rely on financial instruments to hedge against these
risks. Yet financial instruments for hedging long-term risk may not be readily available
or may be costly. Multinational corporations, however, can hedge their economic exposure by using
the choices that operational flexibility offers.  
Network Structure and Operational Flexibility
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NETWORK STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY
While operational flexibility is valuable to firms, it comes with a cost. A multinational network
of subsidiaries is complex, difficult to manage (Roth, 1992; Roth et al., 1991), and entails significant
agency and transaction costs. Agency costs stem from controlling potential mismanagement in
subsidiaries and from monitoring the opportunistic behavior of subsidiary managers. Transaction costs
stem from managing the numerous internal transactions among managers in different foreign
subsidiaries and external transactions with government agencies, suppliers, and customers in different
countries (Hitt et al., 1997). These costs reduce a firm’s growth potential and increase the uncertainty
of future earnings.  Accordingly, firms benefit from their multinational networks only if the positive
value effect of operational flexibility exceeds the negative value effect of the accompanying agency
and transaction costs.
When firms widen their network by establishing subsidiaries in different countries, they
enhance the potential for operational flexibility. Instead of locating subsidiaries in many countries,
firms can concentrate them in a few countries. When firms thus deepen their network, it diminishes
the potential for operational flexibility. In a study of the wealth effects of international mergers and
acquisitions, Doukas and Travlos (1988) find no positive reaction to firms' stock prices when they
deepen their network by acquiring subsidiaries in countries where they already have operations. They
do find a significant positive stock price reaction for acquisitions in countries where firms have no
existing operation.  Accordingly, the value impact of operational flexibility and agency and transaction
costs should be positive for MNCs that have a broad but less concentrated network, and negative for
MNCs with a narrow but highly concentrated network.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING
We predict the ERC to be a positive function of the breadth and a negative function of the
depth of a firm’s multinational network. To examine the link between the ERC and breadth and depth
of the MNC subsidiary network, we created five groups of firms. We first divided our overall sample
of firms into domestic firms and MNCs. The MNC sample was further divided into four groups,
depending on whether the breadth and the depth of an MNC’s subsidiary network were less than or
greater than the median breadth and depth of the overall MNC sample (see Figure 1). Here, and in
the rest of the paper, we emphasize median breadth and depth instead of mean because of skewness
in the variables in the sample distribution
Operational Flexibility and Market Valuation of Earnings
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Figure 1
Classification of MNCs into Different Types According to the Structure of Their Multinational Network
    Breadth
    Type IV:     Type I:
High Breadth & High Breadth &
Low Depth High Depth
   Depth
    Type III:     Type II:
Low Breadth & Low Breadth &
Low Depth High Depth
Notes:
Breadth = Number of foreign countries in which a MNC has at least one majority-owned subsidiary;
Depth = Number of foreign subsidiaries per foreign country;
Type I = MNCs whose breadth and depth are greater than sample medians;
Type II = MNCs whose breadth is lower and depth is greater than sample median;
Type III = MNCs whose breadth and depth are lower than sample medians;
Type IV = MNCs whose breadth is greater and depth is lower than sample median.
We posit that the net effect of the benefits of operational flexibility and agency and transaction
costs will be positive for high-breadth, low-depth (HB, LD) MNCs, and negative for low-breadth,
high-depth (LB, HD) MNCs.  Therefore, expect the ERC of Type IV (HB, LD) MNCs to be greater,
and the ERC of Type II (LB, HD) MNCs to be smaller, than the ERC of domestic firms. Further, we
expect the ERC of Type IV MNCs to be greater than the ERC of other types of MNCs.
We predict the ERC for Type II MNCs to be even smaller than that of domestic firms
because, for these MNCs, the costs associated with operational flexibility exceed the benefits.
Consequently, the net effect of these costs and benefits is negative. Domestic firms have no benefit
from this type of operational flexibility, but they also do not incur the costs of managing a network
of foreign subsidiaries. The net effect is zero for domestic firms.
For Type I MNCs, both breadth and depth are high, and for Type III MNCs, both breadth
and depth are low. For both these MNC types, the effect of operational flexibility on ERC is likely
to be offset by comparable costs. The direction of the net effect on ERC for these firms is,
however, unclear and is therefore not posited here.
Methodology and Data
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Model
Three regression models are used to test the conceptualization of operational flexibility. First,
the ERCs of each of the four types of MNCs and domestic firms are compared using the model:
(1)
Where:
itCAR
~
= unexpected stock returns for firm i for year t cumulated from two days after prior year
earnings announcement to two days after current-year earnings announcement;
    p  = the index for type of MNC, which takes a value of 1, 2, 3, or 4 (representing the four types
of MNCs that vary with respect to breadth and depth of operations);
   Tp   = dummy variable, which is 1 if firm is a type p MNC, and 0 if it is domestic;
EitD = changes in annual earnings from year t -1 to year t for firm i hat belongs to type p; and
  x
~
it  = a mean-zero disturbance term.
The parameter b0 represents the ERC of domestic firms, and b0 +bp represents the ERC of MNCs
that belong to type p. Accordingly, bp represents the difference in ERC between type p MNCs and
domestic firms.
Next, the ERC of the domestic firms is compared with a pooled sample of MNCs using the
model:
xbbaa
~~
itit1it010it
+EM+E+M+=CAR DD          (2)
Where:
    M = a dummy variable that takes a value 0 if a firm is domestic, and 1 if it is multinational.
The parameter b1 captures the average difference in the ERCs of domestic and multinational firms.
All other variables in equation 2 are as previously defined.
Finally, the impact of breadth and depth on the ERC of all the MNCs is examined using the
model:
 (3)
Where:
   B = a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the breadth is greater than the sample median
            breadth, and 0 otherwise; and
   D = a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the depth is greater than the sample median depth,
            and 0 otherwise.
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All other variables are as previously defined. The interaction term (BD) is intended to capture the
possible effect of any interaction between breadth and depth.
The ERC of the pooled MNC sample is given by the partial derivative of the dependent
variable (
itCAR
~ ) with respect to the independent variable (EitD ), and is expressed as follows:
(4)
The ERCs for the four types of MNCs are derived from equation 4 as follows:
ERC for low-breadth (B = 0) and low-depth (D = 0) Type III MNCs:b0
ERC for high-breadth (B = 1) and low-depth (D = 0) Type IV MNCs:b0 +b1
ERC for low-breadth (B = 0) and high-depth (D = 1) Type II MNCs:b0 + b2
ERC for high-breadth (B = 1) and high-depth (D = 1) Type I MNCs:b0 + b1 + b2 + b3
Because the ERC of Type IV (HB, LD) MNCs is expected to be larger and the ERC of Type II (LB,
HD) MNCs is expected to be smaller than the ERC of domestic firms, in equation 1, we expect b4
 > 0 and b2 < 0.  In equation 3, we expect b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, which implies that Type II (LB, HD)
MNCs have a smaller and Type IV (HB, LD) MNCs have a larger ERC than Type III (LB, LD)
MNCs. We expect the ERC of Type I and Type III MNCs will not differ significantly. Therefore, in
equation 3, we expect b3, which captures the difference in ERC between Type I (HB, HD) MNCs and
Type III (LB, LD) MNCs, to be zero.
Note that predicting b3 = 0 in equation 3 is different from predicting b3 = 0 in equation 1. In
equation 3, b3 captures the difference in ERC between Type I and Type III MNCs, while in equation
1, b3 captures the difference in ERC between Type III MNCs and domestic firms.
Measurement of Variables
The dependent variable in all regression models is the cumulative abnormal return (
itCAR
~ ) for
a test period starting from the third day after the previous year’s earnings announcement date through
the second day after the current year’s earnings announcement date, and is measured as follows:
(5)
Where:
a   = current year’s (year t) earnings announcement date;
a - 1  = previous year’s earnings announcement date;
Retid = rate of stock return of firm i for day d;
Retmd = the value-weighted rate of return for the market on date d; and
gˆ ioand gˆ 1i  = the regression estimates of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) parameters.
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The CAPM parameters are estimated using stock and market returns over an estimation period
beginning with the third day after the earnings announcement date of year a - 2 to the s cond day
after the earnings announcement date of year a - 1.
The independent variable, DEit, the change in current earnings, is computed as follows:
(6)
Where:
 EPSit and EPSit-1 = the actual earnings per share for the current and the prior fiscal year; and
 Pit-1                      = the price per share of stock for firm i at the beginning of the current fiscal year.
Consistent with many previous studies, we deflate earnings changes by the beginning stock price in
order to measure unexpected earnings (e.g., Dhaliwal and Reynolds, 1994; East n and Zmijewski,
1989).
Sample, Earnings, and Returns Data 
A firm is classified as an MNC if it has at least one majority-owned foreign subsidiary and as
a domestic firm if it has none. A firm’s foreign operation is classified as a subsidiary if the firm has
an ownership stake of 50% or more. Less-than-majority ownership limits the parent firm’s
influence on the subsidiary’s operating and financial policies, so minority-owned subsidiaries are not
considered.
The initial sample of firms is from the National Register’s 1996 Directory of Corporate
Affiliations, which provides information about foreign subsidiaries. Earnings information is from
accounting data on Standard & Poor’s 1998 COMPUSTAT files. We require that a firm be a U.S.
company and have three consecutive non-missing earnings announcement dates before June 30, 1996,
to be included in our sample. The intersection of the data sets from the Directory of Corporate
Affiliations and COMPUSTAT files represents 1,478 firms.
Daily stock returns and the value-weighted market return indexes are obtained from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 1998 returns file. We require at least 80 non-missing
daily returns available for the estimation period to estimate CAPM parameters, and for the test period
to compute the dependent variable 
itCAR
~ . This requirement results in a sample of 1,378 firms. After
deleting any non-manufacturing firms, the final sample consists of 1,280 firms, of which 589 are
multinationals.
Operational Flexibility and Market Valuation of Earnings
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Table 1
Network Structure of MNCs
Panel A: Complete MNC Sample (589 Firms)
Number of
Foreign Subsidiaries
Number of
Foreign Countries
(Breadth)
Number of Subsidiaries Per
Foreign Country
(Depth)
Median 4 4 1.0455
Mean 11.871 7.796 1.3239
Minimum 1 1 1
Maximum 169 90 5
Standard Deviation 19.030 9.875 0.5387
Panel B: MNC Sample by Type
Low Depth High Depth
Number of
Subs Breadth Depth
Number of
Subs Breadth Depth
Type IV: 62 Firms Type I: 199 Firms
Median 8 8 1 17 12 1.400
Mean 11.758 11.710 1.002 27.462 16.100 1.593Breadth >
4
Std. Dev. 9.120 9.009 0.008 25.581 11.538 0.577
23 Firms 13 Firms
Median 4 4 1 5 4 1.250
Mean 4 4 1 5.571 4 1.393
Breadth =
4
Std. Dev. 0 0 0 1.399 0 0.350
Type III: 210 Firms Type II: 82 Firms
Median 1 1 1 3 2 1.5
Mean 1.671 1.671 1 3.427 2.037 1.819
Breadth <
4
Std. Dev. 0.765 0.765 0 1.267 0.777 0.683
295 Firms 294 Firms
Median 2 2 1 11 8 1.5
Mean 3.972 3.963 1.001 19.742 11.617 1.646Total
Std. Dev. 5.871 5.831 0.004 23.777 11.480 0.609
Note:  There is one firm whose depth equals the median depth (1.0455). This firm is arbitrarily included in the
low-depth groups. As a result, the number of low-depth firms (295) exceeds the number of high-depth firms
(294) by one firm.
Methodology and Data
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Sample Characteristics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the network structure of the MNCs. Panel A, which
displays the statistics for the entire MNC sample, indicates that the breadth and the depth of the
network structure vary. The number of foreign subsidiaries ranges from 1 to 169, the number of
countries where these subsidiaries are located from 1 to 90, and the number of subsidiaries per foreign
country from 1 per country to 5. The median MNC in our sample operates in 4 (median breadth)
foreign countries with 1.0455 (median depth) subsidiaries per country.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the network structure for different types of MNCs. The MNC
sample is divided into different groups based on whether an MNC’s b e dth and depth are less than,
equal to, or greater than sample medians. We first divide the MNC sample into two groups: low-
depth firms (295 firms whose depth is less than or equal to sample median depth) and high-depth
firms (294 firms whose depth is greater than sample median depth). There is one firm whose depth
equals the sample median depth; we arbitrarily include this firm in the low-depth group. Next, we
divide the low- and high-depth firms into high-breadth firms (62 + 199 = 261 firms whose breadth
is greater than sample median breadth); median-breadth firms (23 + 13 = 36 firms whose breadth is
equal to sample median breadth); and low-breadth firms (210 + 82 = 292 firms whose breadth is less
than sample median breadth). The 36 median-breadth firms are excluded from the rest of analysis. We
discuss later whether our results change if these firms were to be classified as high-breadth firms or
as low-breadth firms.
There are more observations in the Type I and III groups (199 + 210 = 409) than in the Type
II and IV groups (62 + 82 = 144). This is because the two variables, breadth and depth, are positively
correlated. Firms with high breadth also tend to have high depth, and vice versa. Grouping firms by
median breadth and depth will not result in an equal number of firms in the four quadrants when
breadth and depth are correlated.  However, it will result in equal column and row totals in the
absence of median firms (firms whose breadth and/or depth equal the sample medians).
Panel A of Table 2 provides selected descriptive statistics for the overall firm sample and the
different subsamples. These statistics show that the sales, total assets, market value, return on assets,
and gross profit margin of MNCs are higher than those of domestic firms.  Among MNCs, Type I
MNCs are the largest firms and Type III the smallest. A comparison of the profitability measures
(return on assets and gross profit margin) indicates that Type I and Type IV MNCs are more
profitable than other MNCs. Since profitability is affected by many different factors such as industrial
composition, size, financial policy, the profitability numbers are useful only for descriptive
comparisons.  Panel B of Table 2, which displays the industrial classification of the sample, shows that
major manufacturing industries are well represented in each of the sample groups, and there are no
major differences in industry concentration among different groups of the sample.
Operational Flexibility and Market Valuation of Earnings
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Industry Representation of Sample Firms
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
MNCs by TypeComplete
Sample
Domestic
Firms
All
MNCs Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Number of Firms 1,280 691 589 199 82 210 62
Sales ($ mil.) 249 136 535 2,718 367 222 548
1,988 443 3,798 8,949 1,068 618 1,962
Total Assets ($ mil.) 202 103 476 2,559 277 173 597
2,139 407 4,168 10,310 961 541 1,595
Market Value of Stocks175 88 439 2,264 244 169 516
($ millions) 1,718 326 3,349 7,813 1,182 533 2,264
Net Income on Assets 0.0528 0.0418 0.0616 0.0624 0.0488 0.0609 0.0733
(ROA) 0.0377 0.0209 0.0565 0.0615 0.0479 0.0513 0.0669
Operating Income on 0.0804 0.0638 0.0926 0.1018 0.0826 0.0829 0.1041
Sales (GPM) 0.0544 0.0209* 0.0918 0.1080 0.0872 0.0751 0.1026
Panel B: Number of Firms in 2-Digit Industry Codes
MNCs by Type
2-digit
SIC
Industry Description
Comp.
Sample
Domestic
Firms
All
MNCs Type
I
Type
II
Type
III
Type
IV
01-09 Agriculture Products 10 8 2 1 0 1 0
10-14 Mining, Oil & Gas, Minerals 69 46 23 4 3 15 1
15-17 Construction 23 16 7 2 2 3 0
20 Food Products 60 38 22 10 4 5 2
21 Tobacco Products 3 1 2 1 0 1 0
22-23 Textile Mill Products 61 44 17 3 6 5 1
24-25 Lumber & Furniture 46 26 20 4 6 8 0
26-27 Paper, Printing, Publishing & Allied  Prods. 62 34 28 11 3 10 3
28 Chemicals & Allied Products 132 55 77 36 9 14 15
29 Petroleum Refining & Related Products23 7 16 9 3 3 0
30 Rubber & Plastic Products 47 30 17 5 2 3 3
31 Leather & Products 13 10 3 0 1 2 0
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, & Concrete 21 14 7 3 1 3 0
33-34 Primary & Fabricated Metals, Machinery105 67 38 11 4 19 2
35 Industrial & Commercial Machinery 184 75 109 35 15 39 16
36-37 Electric & Transportation Equipment 254 135 119 34 19 46 9
38-39 Photo, Watch, Jewelry & Sporting Products167 85 82 30 4 33 10
Total 1280 691 589 199 82 210    62
Results
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Notes:ROA = return on assets; GPM = gross profit margin; 2-digit SIC = first 2 digits of the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code.
Numbers in the first pair of numbers in each row in Panel A (highlighted) for all statistics are medians.
Those in the second row are means. All numbers are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level,
except those marked with *, which are not significant. The test for means is the t-test, d for medians
is the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
RESULTS
Difference in ERC between MNCs and Domestic Firms
Test statistics for differences in the ERC of MNCs and domestic firms are shown in Table 3.
Panel A displays parameter estimates for equation 1 comparing each MNC group with domestic
firms. The results support our hypothesis. The results indicate that the ERC of Type II (LB, HD)
MNCs is smaller and the ERC of Type IV (HB, LD) MNCs is greater than the ERC of domestic
firms.
The estimate of b0, which represents the ERC of domestic firms, is positive and significant
(0.4968, p < 0.05) in each of the four models. The estimate of b2,which represents the difference in
ERCs between domestic firms and Type II MNCs, is negative and significant  (-0.8890, p <  .05), and
the estimate of b4, which represents the difference in ERCs between domestic firms and Type IV
MNCs, is positive and significant (0.9307, p < 0. 05). Together these results suggest that Type IV
MNCs have significantly greater ERC and Type II MNCs have significantly smaller ERC than
domestic firms.
The estimates of b1, which represents the difference in ERCs between Type I MNCs and
domestic firms, and b3, which represents the difference in ERCs between Type III MNCs and
domestic firms, are not significant.
Operational Flexibility and Market Valuation of Earnings
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Table 3
Regression Estimation for Differences in ERC between Domestic Firms and MNCs
Panel A: Type of MNCs Compared to Domestic Firms
      Each Type of MNC Compared to Domestic Firms       
Parameter
Predicted
Sign
All Types of
      MNCs Type I Type II Type III Type IV
a0 -0.0314 -0.0349 -0.0349 -0.0349 -0.0349
(-1.391) (-1.438) (-1.339) (-1.365) (-1.354)
a1 -0.0186 -0.0151
(-0.380) (-0.293)
a2 -0.0718 -0.0683
(-1.015) (-0.856)
a3 -0.0304 -0.0269
(-0.624) (-0.498)
a4 -0.0231 -0.0196
(-0.284) (-0.216)
b0 + 0.5044 0.4968 0.4968 0.4968 0.4968
(6.151*) (5.765*) (5.370*) (5.474*) (5.431*)
b1 ? -0.2792 -0.2717
(-0.795) (0.738)
b2 - -0.8965 -0.8890
(-2.477*) (-2.183*)
b3 ? 0.1616 0.1691
(0.318) (0.302)
b4 + 0.9232 0.9307
(2.225*) (2.016*)
Adjusted R2 0.0417 0.0368 0.0385 0.0341 0.0502
F-Value 6.119* 11.250* 10.237* 10.520* 13.156*
Results
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Panel B: Average Difference in ERC between MNCs and Domestic Firms
Parameter Predicted Sign Estimate t-Value Probability
a0 -0.0349 -1.502 0.1331
a1 -0.0186 -0.542 0.5881
b0 + 0.4968 6.024 0.0001
b1 ? -0.0696 -0.335 0.7378
Adjusted R2 0.0316 F-Value: 13.865*
Notes:
Type I = MNCs whose breadth and depth are greater than sample medians;
Type II = MNCs whose breadth is lower and depth is greater than sample median;
Type III = MNCs whose breadth and depth are lower than sample medians;
Type IV= MNCs whose breadth is greater and depth is lower than sample median.
itCAR
~ = unexpected stock returns for firm i for year t cumulated from two days after prior-year
earnings announcement to two days after current-year earnings announcement;
    p  = the index for type of MNC, which takes a value of 1, 2, 3, or 4 (representing the four
groups of MNCs that vary with respect to breadth and depth of operations);
   Tp   = dummy variable, which is 1 if firm is a type p MNC, and 0 if it is domestic;
EitD = changes in annual earnings from year t -1 to year t for firm i; and
  x
~
it
 = a mean-zero disturbance term.
For Panel A, numbers in the first row of each variable (highlighted) are estimated parameters, and
numbers in the second row (in parentheses) are t-values for these estimates.
· Significant at conventional 5% level for one-tailed test, and 2.5% level for two-tailed test.
Panel B of Table 3 displays the regression estimates for equation 2. This regression model
combines all MNCs and compares the ERCs of the pooled MNC sample with the ERCs of domestic
firms. The parameter b0, which represents the ERC of domestic firms, is positive and significant
(0.4968, p = 0.0001), and the parameter b1, which represents the difference in ERC between domestic
firms and all MNCs, is not (-0.0696, p = 0.7378). This result, together with the results obtained from
equation 1, shows that not taking the differences in the network structure of MNCs into consideration
conceals the differences in earnings valuations between MNCs and domestic firms.
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Impact of Breadth and Depth on ERC
Table 4 displays the regression estimates for equation 3 computed using the MNC sample
only. The parameter b0, which represents the ERC for Type III (LB, LD) MNCs, is significant
(0.7209, p = 0.0202). Recall that the ERC of Type IV firms is b0 + b1 and the ERC of Type II firms
is b0 + b2. The results in Table 4 show that b1 is positive and significant (0.6702, p = 0.0295) and b
is negative and significant (-1.1404, p = 0.0003). These results indicate that Type II (LB, HD) MNCs
have a smaller ERC and Type IV (HB, LD) MNCs have a greater ERC than Type III (LB, LD)
MNCs. The ERCs of Type I (HB, HD) MNCs and Type III (LB, LD) MNCs are not significantly
different. The parameter b3, which represents the interaction of breadth and depth, is not significant.
Table 4
Regression Estimates for Impact on ERC by Breadth and Depth
Parameter Predicted Sign Estimate t-Value Probability
a0 -0.0628 -1.872 0.0617
a1 0.0094 0.135 0.8924
a2 -0.0403 -0.646 0.5188
a3 0.0434 0.465 0.6424
b0 + 0.7209 2.329 0.0202
b1 + 0.6702 2.183 0.0295
b2 - -1.1404 -3.616 0.0003
b3 ? -0.1443 -0.226 0.8211
Adjusted R2: 0.0470 F-Value: 4.470
Notes:
itCAR
~ = unexpected stock returns for firm i for year t cumulated from two days after prior-year
 earnings announcement to two days after current-year earnings announcement;
    B  = a dummy variable measuring the magnitude of breadth, which takes a value 1 if breadth
            is greater than the sample median breadth, and 0 otherwise;
    D  = a dummy variable measuring the magnitude of depth, which takes a value 1 if depth is
            greater than the sample median depth, and 0 otherwise;
EitD = changes in annual earnings from year t -1 to year t for firm i; and
x
~
it
   = a mean-zero disturbance term.
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Sensitivity Analysis
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 reveal that the four types of MNCs and domestic firms
differ with respect to size (sales/market value/total assets). These differences may raise concerns
about whether the results are driven by differences in firm size. Researchers have documented a
negative relationship between ERC and firm size (Atiase, 1985; Collins et al., 1987). The ERC is
negatively related to firm size because more non-accounting information (such as reports by analysts
or news media) is available between the release of accounting earnings for large firms than for small
firms. The availability of such information prior to earnings announcements means that stock prices
capture some of the information embodied in accounting earnings before the earnings are announced.
As a result, the stock price reaction to earnings announcements is less pronounced for large firms than
for small firms. 
It is clear from our findings that the ERCs of Type IV MNCs are not driven by a firm-size
effect. We find the ERC for Type IV MNCs to be larger than the ERC for domestic firms. If firm size
has any effect, it should work against finding a larger ERC for Type IV MNCs because these MNCs
are larger than domestic firms. For Type II MNCs, however, the impact of firm size on the ERC
results is less clear. As predicted, we find the ERC for Type II MNCs to be smaller than the ERC for
domestic firms. However, Type II MNCs are larger than domestic firms, which should contribute
toward finding a smaller ERC for these MNCs when compared to domestic firms.  
To examine the size effect and the robustness of our results, we include firm size as a control
variable in regression equations 1 and 3. We use the logarithm of sales as a proxy for firm size
(Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). The results of the size-controlled regressions are
shown in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 presents size-controlled estimates for equation 1 and panel B
for equation 3.
Consistent with prior research, the coefficients of the firm size variable are negative and
significant in both regressions  (-0.0322, p = 0.0039; and –0.0259, p = 0.0560). A comparison of the
size-controlled results in Table 5 with the same regression results when size effect is not controlled
(Tables 3 and 4) shows that the direction, magnitude, and significance level of all variables remain
largely unaltered. This comparison suggests that our results are robust with respect to firm size effect.
We also test the robustness of the results with respect to industry membership of each group
of firms. We create dummy variables for each of the two-digit SIC codes shown in Panel B of Table
2 and include them in our regression model. The results, not reported, indicate that the industry effect
on our results is negligible since all coefficients of the study variables remain significant and of the
predicted sign.
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Finally, we test whether the classification of the 36 median-breadth firms has any significant
impact on our results. In all test results reported these 36 firms were excluded from the analysis. As
a sensitivity analysis, we run two additional tests: one with the 36 median-breadth firms included as
low-breadth firms, and the other with these firms included as high-breadth firms. The results, not
reported, indicate that the effect of different treatments of median-breadth firms is minor and does
not affect the main results.
Table 5
Sensitivity of Results When Controlling for Firm Size:
Regression Estimation for Differences in ERC Between Domestics and MNCs
Parameter Predicted Sign Estimate t-Value Probability
Panel A: Type of MNCs Compared to Domestic Firms – Size Controlled
a0 0.1307 2.164 0.0307
a1 0.0726 1.250 0.2115
a2 -0.0420 -0.589 0.5558
a3 -0.0168 -0.344 0.7309
a4 0.0229 0.278 0.7809
b0 + 0.4942 6.040 0.0001
b1 ? -0.2714 -0.775 0.4383
b2 - -0.8706 -2.411 0.0160
b3 ? 0.1265 0.250 0.8026
b4 + 0.9023 2.181 0.0294
Size - -0.0322 -2.892 0.0039
Adjusted R2 0.0479 F-Value: 6.375
Panel B: Regression Estimates for Impact on ERC by Breadth and Depth – Size Controlled
a0 0.0782 0.967 0.3341
a1 0.0358 0.507 0.6124
a2 -0.0271 -0.432 0.6658
a3 0.0662 0.705 0.4810
b0 + 0.6946 2.247 0.0250
b1 + 0.6652 2.172 0.0303
b2 - -1.1063 -3.511 0.0005
b3 ? -0.1703 -0.268 0.7891
Size - -0.0259 -1.915 0.0560
Adjusted R2: 0.0534 F-Value: 6.445
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Notes:
itCAR
~ = unexpected stock returns for firm i for year t cumulated from two days after prior-year
earnings announcement to two days after current-year earnings announcement;
p  = the index for type of MNC, which takes a value of 1, 2, 3, or 4 (representing the four
groups of MNCs that vary with respect to breadth and depth of operations);
Tp   = dummy variable, which is 1 if firm is a type p MNC, and 0 if it is domestic;
EitD = changes in annual earnings from year t -1 to year t for firm i;
B  = a dummy variable measuring the magnitude of breadth, which takes a value 1 if breadth
is greater than sample median breadth, and 0 otherwise;
D  = a dummy variable measuring the magnitude of depth, which takes a value 1 if depth is
greater than the sample median depth, and 0 otherwise;
x
~
it
 = a mean-zero disturbance term; and
Size = logarithm of firm sales.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We find that the securities market responds more to the earnings changes of multinational
firms that have subsidiaries in many countries but limit their concentration in any one foreign country
than it does to the earnings changes of domestic firms and other multinational firms. The market is
less responsive to the earnings changes of multinational firms whose subsidiaries are highly
concentrated in a few countries than it is to the earnings changes of other multinational firms and
domestic firms. When the differences in network structure are ignored and all multinationals are
grouped together, the market’s response to earnings changes of multinational firms does not differ
from that of domestic firms. These patterns of the market’s response to earnings changes can be
attributed to differences in operational flexibility that a firm derives from its multinational network
of subsidiaries. 
Multinational firms with a broad and less concentrated network have a positive net value
impact of operational flexibility and associated costs, whereas those with a narrow but highly
concentrated network have a negative net value impact. For the former type of multinational firms,
investors view earnings to be more persistent and more likely to grow, and hence they are more
responsive to the earnings changes of these firms. For the latter type, investors view earnings to be
less persistent and less likely to grow, and hence they are less responsive to the earnings changes of
these firms. 
In a direct test of the link between the breadth and depth of the multinational network and
ERC, we find the breadth of the network is associated with a greater ERC and the depth of the
network is associated with a smaller ERC. This result further reinforces the findings obtained from
testing the ERC differences among different groups of firms.
Operational Flexibility and Market Valuation of Earnings
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Our results show that the market recognizes and incorporates the value of operational
flexibility. If the market perceives a broad network of multinational subsidiaries as contributing to
earnings persistence and earnings growth, managers ought to consider the economic value of such
a network when they make decisions to locate or close foreign subsidiaries.
Our study assumes that firms exploit the operational flexibility opportunities that their
multinational networks provide. In fact, firms vary in their recognition and exploitation of operational
flexibility capabilities (Kogut, 1989). Firms need to be organized and managed appropriately to derive
the benefits of operational flexibility, but a firm can exercise the flexibility option only if it possesses
it, and it can possess it only if it has the appropriate network structure.
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